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Abstract
Academics and journalists have characterized the West African state of Benin as a democracy in
decline under President Patrice Talon, elected in 2016 and reelected in 2021. This thesis
explains that trend and its historical background. After comparing Benin with other African
democracies of varying strengths, it is concluded that despite setbacks experienced under
Talon, in the long run, Benin’s democratic institutions will hold firm and survive.
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Introduction
The Republic of Benin is a country located on the West African coast, at Nigeria’s
western border. At around 10 million people and 100,000 km2, its size and population are
roughly comparable to those of Greece and Pennsylvania. However, in its journey towards
prosperity, Benin shares much more in common with its West African neighbors, and in one
regard has even outshone them: since a 1990 departure from one-party rule, there have been
multiple peaceful transitions of power, competitive elections, and chief executives with respect
for the rule of law. Benin has thus become known as one of the region’s leading democracies.
Yet recent events have called that reputation into question. Since taking office in 2016,
President Patrice Talon has consolidated power and threatened civil rights through increasing
his personal influence over Benin’s legislature and judiciary, casting a shadow over this nation’s
political future. To scholars, such trajectories, involving an incremental erosion of democratic
institutions and norms, constitute “democratic backsliding.”1 Talon was reelected earlier this
year (2021) with 86% of the vote, so a thesis about Benin can be considered timely.2 At the
onset of his second term, the opportunity will be taken to investigate Talon’s authoritarian
shadow and thereby better understand democratic backsliding not only in Benin, but
throughout the whole African continent. Where are the authoritarian drift’s origins? What are
its precise accomplishments and effects? And lastly, where is it all going?
Methodology and Literature Review
So far, scholarly discussion of the Talon presidency is scarce. Benin, after all, is far from
an international power, sitting near the middle of rankings of African states by GDP.3
Neighboring Nigeria and nearby Ghana far overshadow it in academic literature. Still, some
scholars have contributed valuable efforts on Benin specifically. Stéphane Andenga in
Diplomatie provides this thesis’ only academic source on the transformations of the Talon era,
while Thomas Bierschenk, Chris Allen, and Richard Banégas have each contributed journal
articles recounting Benin’s pre-Talon political history, with particular focus on the early-1990s
democratic transition. Given an inability to travel to Benin and interview key figures, the bulk of
research on the country’s present political dynamics must come from news outlets.
International sources such as the French Le Monde and Radio France Internationale (RFI) and
the pan-African Jeune Afrique provide broad summaries of key events, while Benin-based
sources furnish useful quotes and a sense of how events unfolded in real time – and, crucially, a
sense of the government’s sway over the nation’s press. These include L’Evénement Précis,

1

Haggard, Stephan, and Robert Kaufman. "The Anatomy of Democratic Backsliding." Journal of Democracy vol. 32,
no. 4, 2021, p. 27.
2
“Proclamation des résultats provisoires de l’élection présidentielle du 11 avril 2021.” Constitutional Court of
Benin, April 15 2021. Note that Talon is reported to have received 86% of votes for a candidate, but 82% when
invalid votes are counted.
3
“Real GDP (purchasing power parity).” CIA World Factbook.
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Benin Web TV, and La Nouvelle Tribune. Articles from the above outlets are ordered and
synthesized to form the first half of the thesis, a narrative of the backsliding.
The report’s second half represents a deeper look at the issue, attempting to generate
insight from the ensemble of facts by going beyond Benin’s present and beyond Benin’s
borders. Although the priority of this thesis is an understanding of events unfolding in Benin,
the stories of other nations are expected to prove useful to that end by highlighting
commonalities and particularities. Again, sources comprise both international reporting and
several scholarly analyses. The project attempts to cover African democracy as a spectrum,
from relative success stories like Malawi and Burkina Faso, to dictatorships like Rwanda and
Burundi, to countries lying somewhere in between. It is assumed that Talon’s actions are not
taken in isolation, but rather are influenced by events in similar states. Such states present
glimpses into Benin’s future, different potential destinations of the anti-democratic drift. Before
guessing at the endpoint, though, a comprehensive effort should begin at the beginning.
Talon’s ascent: Early alliances and the 2016 presidential election
Today’s Republic of Benin was founded in 1960, as France granted independence to its
former colony. The new state’s first decade was tumultuous; in just 12 years, Benin experienced
eleven presidents and five successful coups.4 The last of these coups, in 1972, saw army major
Mathieu Kérékou rise to power and forcefully retain it for the next two decades. However,
growing debt and corruption in Benin would eventually combine with a general slump among
African economies and produce economic collapse. Mass strikes, protests, and the rapid
dwindling of state funds made the country “increasingly ungovernable,”5 to the point that the
government invited the opposition to a February 1990 “Conference of the Nation’s Living
Forces,” desperate for appeasement. Though originally meant to be “no more than advisory,” it
would quickly claim and use the right to dismiss the government.6 In its place an interim
government and new constitution were formed, and the period during which Benin was one of
Africa’s “democratic model countries” began.7

4

Bierschenk, Thomas. “Democratization without Development: Benin 1989-2009.” International Journal of Politics,
Culture, and Society, vol. 22, no. 3, 2009, p. 348.
5
Bierschenk, 339
6
Allen, Chris. “Restructuring an Authoritarian State: ‘Democratic Renewal’ in Benin.” Review of African Political Economy,
vol. 19, no. 54, 1992, p. 48.
7
Bierschenk, 338
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Presidential elections in modern Benin
Year
1991
1996
2001
2006
2011
2016
2021
2026

Victor
Nicéphore Soglo
Mathieu Kérékou
Mathieu Kérékou
Thomas Boni Yayi
Thomas Boni Yayi
Patrice Talon
Patrice Talon
?
Patrice Talon8

Thomas Boni Yayi

In May 2016, the new Benin held another presidential election to elect its fourth post1990 head of state. The third president, Thomas Boni Yayi, was term-limited and so endorsed a
party colleague, banker and Prime Minister Lionel Zinsou. Beninese presidential elections
include runoffs; Zinsou won the first round, but lost the second to Talon by an overwhelming
margin: 65% to 35%.9 10 The reasons for this massive gap are a first step towards explaining
Talon’s path to power. Both of Boni Yayi’s terms, starting in 2006 and then again in 2011, were
rocked by scandals and infighting – over his ten-year tenue, over 150 minsters served in his
cabinets. 11 By the time of the 2016 election, even Boni Yayi’s cousin and brother-in-law were
reported to have left his inner circle to ally themselves with Talon. Despite Zinsou’s efforts to
distinguish himself from and even critique his predecessor, Boni Yayi’s unpopularity compelled
voters to look beyond officeholders in hopes of a “rupture” with the political class of the time.
An editorial in L’Evénement Précis summed up this perspective well, asking voters, “Why not
think that these businessmen, strengthened by their experience in management, would give a
new impulse to public governance?... Patrice Talon and Sébastien Ajavon’s arrival into political
activity is part of the bankruptcy of the political class and its obsolete partisan system.”12 These
two businessmen (Ajavon made his fortune in frozen chickens), neither of whom had ever
before run for public office, were the only two candidates besides Zinsou to score double-digit
8

“Anciens Gouvernements.” Gouvernement de la République du Bénin.
Hessoun, Charly. “Proclamation des résultats du 1er tour au Bénin: texte de la déclaration de HOLO.” La Nouvelle
Tribune, February 4 2020.
10
Hessoun, Charly. “Bénin : Lionel Zinsou reconnaît « une victoire très nette de Patrice Talon » à la présidentielle.”
La Nouvelle Tribune, February 4 2020.
11
Boko, Hermann. “Bénin : la cruelle fin de mandat de Thomas Boni Yayi.” Le Monde, March 24 2016.
12
Gbenoudon, Léandre. “Elections présidentielles de février 2016: L’énigme Talon – Ajavon, à qui la faute ?”
L’Evénement Précis, November 20 2015.
9
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percentages in the first round. Talon’s 25% score placed him just barely into the runoff ahead of
Ajavon’s 23%, thus adding an element of luck to Talon’s considerable resources.
For Talon was far from new to Beninese politics. Even before his presidency, the cotton
millionaire had had tremendous ability to influence the nation’s political landscape. He donated
to the campaign of Nicéphore Soglo, Benin’s first post-conference president, back in 1991, and
was ironically the largest donor to Boni Yayi’s campaign in 2006.13 Talon’s successful support of
Boni Yayi on the campaign trail marked a personal milestone: his first public political
appearances. Talon’s entry into electoral politics was therefore gradual, and relied on positive
relationships with more popular figures. After Boni Yayi’s victory, though, the friendship turned
cold. In 2009 Talon completed a monopoly on imports of cotton industry inputs, and in 2011
further extended his influence over Beninese trade by securing a lucrative contract from the
Boni Yayi government. Benin Control, a company headed by Talon, was granted management of
Benin’s Import Verification Program, assessing the tax value of imports into the port of
Cotonou, Benin’s economic capital.14 Many developing states, including Benin, had signed PVI
contracts before, but this effort hit a snag. Just a year after it was signed, the contract was
cancelled, and for seemingly the first time Talon’s career hit serious roadblocks: Benin Control
was charged with embezzling over €20 million, Talon himself was struck by seven criminal
charges, and in May 2012 he fled the country for Paris.15 Later that year, in a larger-than-life
twist, the rivalry escalated further as Talon was accused of having attempted to poison Boni
Yayi during the latter’s official visit to Brussels. According to a prosecutor, Talon bribed Boni
Yayi’s niece and doctor to poison the president’s medicine. They, plus one of Boni Yayi’s former
commerce ministers, were all arrested, and an FBI lab confirmed the presence of poison agents
in the medicine. An investigation was opened against Talon, now under surveillance by
Parisians hired by Boni Yayi, but it came to nothing. In 2014 Talon received a pardon, and in
2015 he made a triumphant return to Benin, campaigning to replace Boni Yayi.
Two weeks after the first round of voting Talon triumphed, finally taking center stage in
the country he had long influenced behind the scenes. His victory was aided by a crucial
endorsement: Ajavon’s, who declared himself a “kingmaker.”16 An open letter written by
himself and other former candidates promised voters that Talon would “not attempt any act of
personal vengeance, while rendering the fight against impunity effective and exemplary,” and
was signed, “Forward for the defense of democratic gains.”17

13

Duhem, Vincent. “Bénin : l’irrésistible ascension de Patrice Talon.” Jeune Afrique, April 4 2016.
“Bénin : le PVI reprend ses activités dans le port de Cotonou.” Radio France Internationale, April 3 2017.
15
Duhem, “Bénin : l’irrésistible ascension de Patrice Talon.”
16
Mbog, Raoul. “Présidentielle au Bénin : quatre clés pour comprendre le match Zinsou-Talon.” Le Monde, March
10 2016.
17
Nobime, Flore. “Mobilisation autour du chantre de la rupture pour le second tour de la présidentielle 2016:
Soutien massif de 25 candidats recalés à Talon.” L’Evénement Précis, March 15 2016.
14
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Talon’s presidency: economic growth and authoritarian drift
So, what was the outcome of all this? Statistically, Talon’s presidency has been typical,
even successful. According to the World Bank, Benin’s overall GDP has grown every year with
him in office – even in 2020 – a feat none of his predecessors can claim, and GDP per capita also
continues a steady climb. Benin’s fiscal deficit has fallen “considerably,” while the debt to GDP
ratio has stabilized.18
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“Benin Overview: Development news, research, data.” The World Bank.
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World Bank data, formatted with Excel, on Benin’s GDP since independence in 1960. Note the continuing
increases over Talon’s presidency, which began in 2016 (red marker).19 20

With regards to infrastructure, a railway linking Cotonou and Niamey, Niger’s capital, is
in the planning stages and a contract has been awarded to the Chinese government.21 When
the project initially announced by Boni Yayi is finished, Benin will have its first new rail line since
the colonial era and first international connection, amplifying trade between the two
neighbors. This is among several projects in Talon’s official infrastructure plan, Benin Revealed,
which together reach into the hundreds of millions of dollars. Others include the construction
of a new international airport, the renovation of Cotonou’s port, and the expansion of the
country’s highway network.22
Yet these inauspicious trends accompany enormous changes to Benin’s political
landscape. The composition of its national parliament is drastically different, Talon has put a
personal stamp on both the media and judiciary, and new laws strategically restrict civil
liberties.

19

“GDP (current US$) – Benin.” The World Bank.
“GDP per capita (current US$) – Benin.” The World Bank.
21
“Ni Bolloré ni Petrolin : pour le train, le président béninois préfère Pékin.” Le Monde, March 23 2018.
22
“Etat de mise en œuvre du PAG.” Bénin Révélé.
20
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Changes to Benin’s elections
While its presidential elections are held every five years, Benin’s legislative elections
take place every four. This imbalance means that a legislative election was held in 2015, a year
prior Talon’s election, and another occurred three years after, in 2019. The 2015 round resulted
in a total of eleven parties elected to the national parliament out of twenty total competing.23
But only two parties participated in the 2019 elections – and neither had even existed in 2015.
Where does this dramatic shift come from?
In 2009, Bierschenk estimated a total of 122 political parties in Benin; ten years later,
Jeune Afrique put the total at 278.24 Most of these, though, are not serious; they actually
represent means for local political leaders to “measure their political weight,” hoping to
leverage temporary prominence into long-lasting appointments or simply build name
recognition. Even the few major parties with chances at winning multiple seats, according to
Bierschenk, have a regional rather than national base, reflecting the country’s ethnic and
geographical divisions. This analysis seemed to still hold true for the 2015 elections, in which
three-quarters of the legislature’s seats were won by four particular parties out of the eleven
elected. Each concentrated support in a particular region; each was led by one of the figures or
families that have dominated electoral politics in Benin since 1990.25 Benin Renaissance, for
example, was led by Soglo’s wife, and the Social Democratic Party by Bruno Amoussou, a
National Assembly member since the 1970s.26 Hence for Talon, (as well as Ajavon), running as
an independent in 2016 made tremendous sense. Though, of course, he had been intimately
involved with the existing political system, remaining officially unaffiliated for his first actual
campaign allowed him to brand himself to voters as a break from not just Boni Yayi but Benin’s
entire political past. After the scandals of Boni Yayi, after decades of politicians without
widespread appeal, the scene was ripe for a new figure to arrive and charismatically portray
himself as a truly national leader.
Talon’s ambition to overturn the post-1990 party environment continued into his
presidency and inevitably made its mark on elections for the national legislature. Bierschenk
has harsh words for this body, alleging that the National Assembly can easily be bypassed by
the President and in any case “does not possess the technical capacity to challenge the
administration.”27 Consequently, as of his analysis, most new laws were based on initiatives
from the executive, not legislators. This characterization makes it all the less surprising that in
October 2018, the National Assembly passed a law which promised to radically change Benin’s
electoral landscape and would soon consolidate Talon’s authority by making it dramatically
23

“PROCLAMATION DES RESULTATS DES ELECTIONS LEGISLATIVES DU 26 AVRIL 2015 AU BENIN.” Quotidien
Fraternité, May 5 2015.
24
Bierschenk, 351
25
“IGN BENIN » CARTOTHEQUE.” Institut Géographique Nationale.
26
“Militantisme, expérience et conviction politique : Bruno Amoussou, un exemple.” Bénin Espoir, December 1
2020.
27
Bierschenk, 350
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harder to both create an opposition party and run for office with it. Prior to the 2018 elections
bill, establishing a political party officially recognized and thus eligible for ballot access required
120 members; the new law upped this to 1,555.28 29 Before Talon, running for a seat in
Parliament required a deposit of 100,000 African Financial Community Francs (FCFA), or about
USD$170. The 2018 bill raised this to 3 million FCFA, or $5,000 – a hefty sum in a country with a
per capita GDP of about $1,200.30 31 Moreover, it obligated parties to stand at least one
candidate in each of Benin’s 24 constituencies, ostensibly in order to do away with regionalist
groups. With a total of 83 seats in the National Assembly, this meant that a party hoping to
contest every seat had to cough up over 200 million FCFA, or $400,000.
Unsurprisingly, the lead up to the 2019 legislative elections featured the first real
political scandal of Talon’s tenure. That spring, each party hoping to participate had to submit a
package of files to the National Autonomous Election Commission, or CENA. A total of seven
parties applied, a far cry from the twenty participating in the previous legislatives. Only two, the
Republican Bloc (BR) and Progressive Union (UP), were approved, and only they appeared on
ballots. Mass resignations from other parties just the previous year had led to UP and BR’s
formations, with both swearing allegiance to Talon.32 Despite their best efforts, the other five
parties applying had submitted “incomplete dossiers,” according to a CENA announcement
made just a month before the election.33 An assemblymember from Boni Yayi’s party
responded that this represented “a personal interpretation of the law,” focused on finding
“traps” in the opposition parties’ dossiers. Furious, they called for a boycott of the elections,
which then saw dramatically reduced turnout; whereas the 2015 elections had seen a rate of
66%, in 2019 this fell to 27%.34
Among the new laws passed during Talon’s presidency, the new election regulations are
likely the most threatening to Benin’s democracy. After all, elections are the starting point of
every democracy. They are not the only, but certainly the most basic and powerful means by
which the citizenry can express its opinion. Policies and politicians to the people’s pleasing are
rewarded; those deemed detrimental are removed and replaced via the ballot box, at least in
theory. Hence, unfair elections challenge a government’s claim to reflect the will of its citizens,
even as that will becomes all the more obscure. Whether or not the five opposition dossiers
were really incomplete, the 2019 legislative elections can probably be called unfair. The

28

Millecamps, Matthieu. “[Analyse] Bénin : branle-bas électoral.” Jeune Afrique, 24 January 2019.
Soudan, François. “[Édito] Bénin : la démocratie selon Patrice Talon.” Jeune Afrique, March 2 2021.
30
Ganhouegnon, Hervé. “Bénin-Assemblée nationale : 250 millions pour être candidat à l’élection présidentielle.”
Bénin Web TV, August 8 2018.
29

31

“GDP per capita (current US$) – Benin.” The World Bank.

32

Silver Konan, André. “Grand Format Bénin : un échiquier politique bouleversé.” Jeune Afrique, February 2 2018.
33
Tchanou, Christian. “Décision après l’examen des candidatures pour les législatives 2019: La Céna valide deux
dossiers, Républicains et Progressistes”, L’Evénement Précis, March 6 2019.
34
Andenga, Stéphane. “Bénin: Le Basculement Autoritaire d’un Modèle Démocratique Exceptionnel.” Diplomatie, no. 101,
2019, p. 31.
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electoral code in place forced all aspiring parties to be both national and extremely wellendowed, shutting out candidates outside of the country’s elite.
After the elections, Talon would concede that the application of the electoral code “has
done us harm.” In October 2019, he promoted a “dialogue” on the subject in the National
Assembly, inviting seven parties besides the ones loyal to him.35 A new electoral code was
adopted which relieved the financial burden, but not by much – the 3 million FCFA requirement
went down to 1.5 million. A comparison of the deposits demanded in Benin and three
neighboring countries demonstrates that both Benin’s 2018 and 2019 electoral codes are
strangely out of sync with their counterparts. Ivory Coast, Niger, and Burkina Faso are similar to
Benin in economic stature, and yet Benin asks much more of its citizens to run for office. Of
course, the new electoral code had been voted on and approved not by the opposition, but by
UP and BR. After the embarrassment of the legislatives’ turnout, Talon may have wanted to
save face somewhat.

Deposits required to run for political office in Benin and neighboring West African states
Country
Benin (before 2018 reforms)37
Benin (2018 reforms)38
Benin (2019 reforms)39
Ivory Coast40
Niger41
Burkina Faso42

Presidency deposit
15 million FCFA
250 million FCFA
50 million FCFA
20 million FCFA
25 million FCFA
10 million FCFA

Legislature deposit
100,000 FCFA
3 million FCFA
1.5 million FCFA
100,000 FCFA
100,000 FCFA
50,000 FCFA

GDP / capita36
~700,000 FCFA
~700,000 FCFA
~750,000 FCFA
~1.4 million FCFA
~350,000 FCFA
~500,000 FCFA

Interestingly, Andenga notes that the candidacy reform project had been started before
Talon’s term, by the 2015 incarnation of the National Assembly. The effort represented, he
says, “the will of the political class to see a partisan landscape emerge in rupture with the
35

Somalon, Yannick. “Fin Dialogue politique: Talon s’engage à concrétiser les recommandations des assises.”
L’Evénement Précis, October 14 2019.
36
“GDP per capita (current US$) - Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, Burkina Faso.” The World Bank. Conversions of US
dollars to CFFA francs made through xe.com.
37
Ganhouegnon, “Bénin-Assemblée nationale : 250 millions pour être candidat à l’élection présidentielle.”
38
“Loi N° 2018-31 du 09 octobre 2018.” Secrétariat général du Gouvernement du Bénin. See articles 111, 233
(presidential elections), 272 (legislative elections)
39
“Loi N° 2019-43 du 15 novembre 2019.” Secrétariat général du Gouvernement du Bénin. See articles 97, 138
(presidential elections), 174 (legislative elections)
40
“Les textes fondamentaux.” Gouvernement de Côte d’Ivoire. Download the “CODE ELECTORAL” document, Ctrl-F
search for “caution”
41
“Code électoral.” Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante – Niger. Download the document, Ctrl-F search
for “caution”
42
“Documents.” Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement et du Conseil des Ministres [Burkina Faso]. Download the
“Code Electoral” document, Ctrl-F search for “caution”
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former system,” a system so filled with clientelist practices, “rentier solidarities,” and
“ephemeral alliances without an ideological basis” that it had “paralyzed the functioning of the
state.”43 Bierschenk agreed with Andenga’s charge of ideological waffling, asserting that most
Beninese parties have “no political program” and the faintest of principles: “Politicians are not
elected to defend policy issues, but to assure that government resources are channeled to their
region of origin.”44 This creates a feedback loop of corruption involving wealthy party sponsors
who help elect new politicians, who then in turn secure government contracts for their
sponsors. In enacting the reforms, Benin’s parliament asked itself the right question – how to
improve itself? – but, likely encouraged by Talon, found the answer not through self-criticism
but through self-insulation from critical opponents.
Later, the two other types of elections in Benin would undergo their own procedural
tweaks. The next municipal elections were held in 2020, with a new requirement that, again,
parties submit candidate lists for every municipality. An electoral threshold of 10% was also
established; only parties able to achieve at least that percentage of votes at the national level
would be eligible for mayoralties or city council seats.45 A few months prior to the election,
Emmanuel Tiando, the CENA president, expressed a desire to turn the page from the chaos of
the legislatives, which were “completely out of sync with what Benin had known until now, with
the democratic principle desiring that the government and opposition alike can participate in
an election.”46 For the municipals, “a certain number of points have been improved, notably the
possibility for the parties to correct the errors which may be identified.” In addition to,
naturally, BR and UP, the CENA recognized three opposition parties: Cowry Forces for an
Emergent Benin (FCBE, the party of Boni Yayi and Zinsou), the Party of the Democratic Renewal,
and the Democratic Union for a New Benin.
Yet among those three, only FCBE, at 15%, would overcome the threshold, which UP
and BR accomplished with ease. When all the results were in, FCBE had captured 6 mayoralties
– the only of Benin’s 77 mayors to represent opposition parties.47 This result would call into
question the legitimacy of presidential elections, too, for new rules in those contests mandate
that presidential candidates pick up “sponsorships” from elected officials so that different
candidates represent different local interests. When Talon’s government began discussing
reforms, advisory experts had proposed a sponsorship requirement and specified that it should
include not just national representatives and mayors but council members of every level of
municipal government – around thirty thousand possible sponsors.48 But instead Benin’s

43

Andenga, 31
Bierschenk, 352
45
Michodigni, Benn. “Communales au Bénin : le parti FCBE relève une faille du code électoral.”, Bénin Web TV,
April 20 2020.
46
Millecamps, Mathieu. “A un an de la présidentielle au Bénin, une démocratie en chantiers.” Jeune Afrique,
February 24 2020.
47
Lepidi, Pierre. “Au Bénin, une élection présidentielle sur fond de dérive autoritaire. » Le Monde, April 10 2021.
48
Vidjingninou, Fiacre. “Révision de la Constitution au Bénin : ce qui va changer.” Jeune Afrique, November 7 2019.
44
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legislature wrote the law to so that only those in the first two categories could be sponsors, and
set the minimum required at 10%.49 In practical terms this meant 16 endorsements, adding
together the 83 assembly members and 77 mayors. But given that UP and BR had captured
every assembly seat in 2019, a presidential candidacy without some support from the
president’s own affiliated parties was impossible.
Changes to Benin’s judiciary
In keeping with his outsider image, Talon campaigned on a promise to eliminate
corruption at the highest levels of Beninese politics. Conveniently, this pledge has facilitated
the targeting of Talon’s highest-profile opponents; each new arrest is portrayed as evidence of
Talon’s honesty. Ajavon, for example, was sentenced in 2018 to twenty years in prison for
cocaine trafficking.50 His businesses liquidated, he fled to France, where he is now an official
political refugee. “If [the French government] accorded asylum to our client,” his lawyers
contended in 2020, “it is because Benin is no longer a safe country. No more than four years
will be necessary for the country to sink into dictatorship.” After they filed with the African
Commission on Human and People’s Rights, the Commission ruled in Ajavon’s favor, and
ordered the suspension of Benin’s 2020 municipal elections.51 Talon and the CENA ignored the
demand and the elections went ahead. A year later, Benin would withdraw from the ACHPR, no
longer allowing the court to receive legal challenges from Beninois citizens.
Ajavon is not alone. Lionel Zinsou, second place in the 2016 presidential contest, was
sentenced to five years of ineligibility for office due to “exceeding campaign costs.” Komi
Koutché, Boni Yayi’s former finance minister, was indicted for embezzlement of public funds
and lives in the United States, also in exile. A third former member of Boni Yayi’s cabinet,
Reckya Madougou, was arrested in March 2021 and sentenced to 20 years in prison for
supposedly plotting assassinations; she had been struggling to collect sponsorships for a
presidential run.52 Since just the beginning of 2021, states an Amnesty International report
published in March, “We have counted the charge or arrest of at least twelve political

49

Houngbadji, Cochimau. “Présidentielle 2021 au Bénin: "Il n'y a aucun risque d'exclusion", Alain Orounla.” Benin
Web TV, December 21 2020.
50
Lepidi, Pierre. « Au Bénin, quatre ans après l’élection de Patrice Talon, la dérive autoritaire. » Le Monde, May 15
2020.
51
Vidjingninou, Fiacre. « Élections locales au Bénin : le gouvernement dénonce « l’immixtion » de la CADHP. »
Jeune Afrique, April 22 2020. Note that Ajavon had been tried for cocaine trafficking in 2016, after cocaine shipped
to one of his businesses was discovered, but courts could not directly implicate Ajavon and no conviction was
made. In 2018, he was tried again by the CRIET. The African Court of Human and People’s Rights claimed that the
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opponents or dissident voices.”53 Even a politically unaffiliated academic would face arrest.54
Joel Aivo, a law professor at the National University of Benin, was arrested in April 2021 and
sentenced to 10 years in prison on charges of money laundering and “attack to state security”
after having critiqued Talon and the new candidacy requirements for years.55 Earlier in 2021, he
had announced his own campaign for president under his own newly created party, the Front
for the Restoration of Democracy, and begun travelling around Benin. According to his lawyers,
Aivo’s sentencing would be followed by mistreatment in prison, where he contracted COVID-19.
He was denied admittance to a hospital and would have to request a friend and licensed doctor
to visit to receive treatment. These arrests robbed the ever-shrinking opposition of its most
prominent members, inhibiting each of the above from mounting a challenge to Talon in 2021.
He would coast to an easy reelection, collecting 86% of votes against two candidates who were
largely unknown by the public and largely unendorsed by an opposition suspicious of their UP
and BR sponsorships.
The opposition politicians’ cases have been prosecuted through the Court of Repression
of Economic and Terrorist Infractions, or CRIET, a political body created in 2018. Though
nominally a nonpartisan component of Talon’s anticorruption campaign, after considering its
actions, Andenga qualifies it as actually a political instrument.56 Evidence to that effect comes
from one of its former members, Essowé Batamoussi. Now in exile, the judge claimed in an
interview with RFI that “all the decisions that we made were under pressure.” In the sentencing
of Reckya Madougou, he went on, “the dossier did not contain a single element which could
have inclined us to imprison her. It wasn’t the first time. There were several cases where we
received instructions from the chancellery.”57 When contacted, Talon’s Minister of Justice,
Séverin Quenum, sidestepped the allegations, claiming not to personally know Batamoussi and
that in fact Talon had been the victim. “Madougou and her political allies of the radical
opposition,” he asserted, “wish to provoke an insurrection intended to end the current
president’s term.” There is little proof beyond Batamoussi’s remarks that each of the CRIET
convictions were false, but it is unlikely that so many prominent figures should all have been
guilty. The outward appearance of Benin’s judiciary is not helped by Talon’s appointment of his
former personal lawyer, Joseph Djogbenou, as first the Minister of Justice and then president of
the Constitutional Court.58
Finally, a more general example of executive meddling in the judiciary has been
alterations to Benin’s High Magistrature Council, a body common in Francophone states and
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meant to act as a sort of check on executive authority by approving or rejecting the president’s
judicial appointments. A small number of representatives of the chief executive on these
councils is typical, but Benin has increased the amount from three to eight, a unilateral move
the country’s judges’ union decried as an “odious invasion.”59
Changes to civil liberties
In December 2019, at an international conference focused on fake news, a Beninese
prosecutor stated that Benin “does not offer security to litigants,” that the legislative elections’
internet shutdown was an “admission of weakness by the government,” and finally that “the
digital code is like a weapon pointed at the temples of journalists.” Ignace Soussou, a journalist
for Benin Web TV, posted these remarks on Twitter. That same digital code was applied to
Soussou, and he was sentenced to six months in prison.60 Ambiguously, the law, enacted in
2017, prohibits “harassment through electronic communication.” In total, estimates Amnesty
International, at least seventeen people have been investigated or arrested with it.61 Another
noteworthy example is Loth Houénou, the chief of the local-scale Republican Values Party. For
posting social media videos critical of Talon’s governance, Houénou was sentenced in
November 2020 to two years of prison.62
With the new digital code’s help, said Soussou after his release, “the freedom of
expression declines in my country. My condemnation was a signal sent to the press.” More
signals had been sent earlier. In December 2016, four broadcast outlets with some connection
to the opposition were shut down.63 Radio Soleil and Sikka TV were both owned by Ajavon,
while Eden TV was owned by a National Assembly member who had served as Ajavon’s
presidential campaign manager. Meanwhile, E-telé was known for its support of Boni Yayi.
Allegedly, each broadcast was operating out of a different location than it was registered at;
each broadcast, though, claimed it had notified the government already, and received no
warning.
Other new laws target freedom of protest as well as freedom of speech, such as a 2018
prohibition on “gathering without prior authorization.”64 Its effects would be on full display
during the 2019 legislatives, which, despite the lack of any surprise as to the results, were still
rocked by conflict and fear. On the day of, Internet access was mysteriously cut throughout the
entire country, blocking social media. “For the moment,” said a government spokesperson
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about the blackout, “I have no explanation.”65 If it was meant to inhibit organized
demonstrations, it didn’t work: protests against the opposition’s exclusion erupted in the
hometowns of Boni Yayi and Komi Koutché during the elections and continued over the next
few days. Roads were barricaded and polling stations were burned. Police responded with tear
gas, anti-riot hoses, and gunfire. According to Amnesty International, at least four protestors
were killed in the post-election protests, including a mother of seven and a nineteen-year-old.66
At the time of their report’s publication, almost two weeks after the protests, the victims’
families were still barred from viewing and burying the bodies. Talon’s Interior Minister, Sacca
Lafia, admitted that the police had gone too far, telling RFI that “it was late at night, and there
were a few acts which went against the orders given.”67 Even so, he argued, “probably, the
police were overwhelmed… They had to act in this way to hold and push back the protestors.” A
law passed in 2017, providing more legal protections to officers, likely facilitated “this way” of
acting.68 Citing the 2018 “gathering without prior authorization” law, they made dozens of
arrests.
At the same time, there were still some positive indicators for the future of Benin’s
media and judiciary during Talon’s first term. In July 2018, Benin’s legislature passed a tax on
digital communication: 5 FCFA per megabyte used on social media services like Facebook and
WhatsApp, and a 5% fee on texts and calls. The nonprofit Internet Without Borders argued that
this would “violate freedom of expression, and threaten everyone’s access to a free and open
internet.”69 “For many people in Benin,” explained Mylene Flicka, a digital entrepreneur and
activist who campaigned against the law, “social media are internet… By making them so
expensive to access, the government are not only killing dreams but also cutting off voices.”70
But after many Beninois social media users quickly adapted to VPNs and more obscure social
media apps, the presidency gave up and announced the law’s repeal in September.71 Talon
cited several reasons, ranging from negative economic impacts to, interestingly, concerns that
the taxes would “particularly for the most modest consumers… hinder the democratization of
the internet,” mimicking activist rhetoric.72
Another positive sign involves the newspaper La Nouvelle Tribune, which was suspended
by a government agency in May 2018 for publishing “a crusade of insults and outrageous
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reporting on the private life of the head of state.”73 The first court that the newspaper took
their case to agreed with the Audiovisual and Communication Authority, but in May 2019 an
appeals court ruled that the suspension of La Nouvelle Tribune was an “affront” and needed to
be lifted. The newspaper is back in business today, and so are the four aforementioned
broadcasters, suggesting varying degrees of respect for the rule of law, or influence from
above, throughout the judicial ranks. 74
Historical analysis: today’s Benin in its own history
In both its corruption and challenging of democratic norms, Talon’s emergence and all
its accompanying nuances are very much a product of Benin’s political history, even going all
the way back to the beginning. Bierschenk writes that upon Benin’s independence, “a political
synthesis emerged of évolués [Africans educated in a European system], who held political and
administrative power, and local entrepreneurs, mainly involved in trade, who had no political
pretensions and lived from political protection and in turn financed the politicians.”75 After
fading during the Kérékou state socialist era, this arrangement reappeared “largely intact”
along with multiparty politics, evident in the modern-day donation-contract-donation feedback
loops described earlier. Chris Allen predicted as much at the dawn of Beninese democracy,
suggesting that clientelism and associated regional voting may create a political environment
which is “exclusive, corrupt, elitist, and violent.”76
Talon’s personal background as Benin’s foremost cotton magnate clearly places him in
continuity with this tradition. Cotton, Benin’s “only true resource,”77 is reported to make up
53% of Benin’s exports,78 and the U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates that Benin is the
second-largest cotton producer in Africa.79 Talon’s dominance in the industry means that in his
person, the political and economic classes are not just interwoven but unified. He himself is one
of the wealthy patrons who had exchanged political donations for political rewards, and yet he
broke with the tradition by acquiring his own “political pretensions” and succeeding in them.
Talon is Benin’s fourth post-1990 president; the others, before entering politics, had not been
business barons like him but an economist (Soglo), a soldier (Kérékou, in a comeback bid), and a
banker (Boni Yayi). Zinsou, again, was also a banker. Now with Talon the landscape is much
clearer. Countless conflicts of interests, but no more need for cross-elite negotiation. Plus ça
change…
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What does Talon himself make of his conflicts of interests? Any such accusations, he
told Le Monde in an interview, “are completely unfounded… I no longer have direct personal
interests in my businesses. My parents, my children, and my friends continue to have some, but
I have acted to ensure that they are never involved in contracts I am required to make decisions
on.”80 Despite these concessions, the interviewers responded, you still control, through
intermediaries, political and economic life in Benin. “Is it outlawed to be free from want?” Talon
responded. “In what way would being free from want inhibit good governance?” And then,
ominously, a final reassurance: “The need to build a fortune no longer concerns me. What
motivates me now is success.” That quote is perhaps the clearest distillation of Talons’ brand:
Money no longer concerns me. I can’t be bought, because I’m the one who does the buying.
Support from current political elites is likely another key to Talon’s success. As
previously discussed, Talon’s achievement of his current position can be partially attributed to
years spending cotton money on ingratiating himself with past elites. But he could not have
retained and strengthened his position without the assent of the old system’s regional power
players who, for the most part, are still around. One such power broker is Bruno Amoussou,
nicknamed the “fox of Djakotomey,” his hometown.81 At 82 years old, Amoussou is as wellversed in Beninese politics as anyone; unlike the 63-year-old Talon, Amoussou has been an
adult during the entirety of Beninese independence. Starting in 1990, the four-decade legislator
made four separate presidential campaigns before giving up. Still, he has found ways to remain
near the summit of Beninese politics. Amoussou was Speaker of the National Assembly during
the Soglo presidency, then Kérékou’s Minister of State, and since then only the leader of
multiple opposition parties – most recently Progressive Union. As leader of one of the two
Talon-allied parties, he is today reported to be one of the president’s closest advisors, despite
their different political leanings. For years, Amoussou was an avowed social democrat, while
Talon the ex-CEO is an “ultra-liberal, profoundly hostile to social measures,” according to
economist Noelia Atindégla.82 But proximity to Talon keeps Amoussou at the center of the
action.
Talon’s testing of institutional limits also continues a pattern, this one building upon his
predecessor’s efforts. Indeed, Andenga asserts that the “fracture in the democratization
trajectory followed by the country since the 1990 national conference” first emerged under
Boni Yayi, not Talon, under whom it rather “seems to aggravate.”83 Richard Banégas explains
that many of the former president’s scandals involved his “increasingly clan-like exercise of
power. Warped administrative appointments, recruitments to the senior civil service and
80

Kpatindé, Francis. “Patrice Talon: « C’est ma volonté de réformer le Bénin qui irrite la classe politique, rien
d’autre».” Le Monde, April 29 2018.
81
Duhem, Vincent. “Bénin : Bruno Amoussou, l’homme qui murmure à l’oreille de Patrice Talon.” Jeune Afrique,
June 2 2019.
82
Vidjingnou, Fiacre. “Bénin - le bilan social de Patrice Talon est-il à la hauteur de son bilan économique ?” Jeune
Afrique, April 2 2021.
83
Andenga, 28

19

companies, economic regional favoritism, and the proliferation of scandals have convinced
southerners of the existence of a plan to concentrate power in the hands of northerners.”84
Boni Yayi’s public image only inflamed the charges of regionalist prejudice; he indulged in
“tribalist discourses” “regularly.”85 Worse, various attempts by Boni Yayi to centralize personal
authority displayed a “growing paranoia,” such as Talon’s Paris surveillance and the arrest of
Lionel Agbo, a lawyer and ex-advisor to Boni Yayi.86 During a press conference, Agbo had
accused the president and his associates of corruption, and was then charged with “offending
the head of state.” Berthe Cakpossa, director of the network which had broadcasted Agbo’s
polemic, was also sentenced to prison.87 Maybe the most notable of Boni Yayi’s misdeeds was a
2013 attempt to amend Benin’s constitution. On the surface, the president’s draft bill appeared
to boost Benin’s democratic credentials, for example by establishing a “Court of Auditors,” but
citizens were quick to notice a clause which would have allowed Boni Yayi to run for two more
presidential terms.88 As the 1990 constitution permits two maximum,89 and Boni Yayi had
already been elected twice, citizens poured into the streets, calling their protest movement
“Don’t Touch My Constitution.”
What, then, distinguishes the two presidents? Why does this thesis focus on Talon and
not Boni Yayi? The answer is simply that Boni Yayi’s successor has gone much farther in
overturning democratic norms. Both Beninois presidents drew criticism for stocking the
judiciary with allies, but only under Talon has that government branch imprisoned high-profile
political opponents, outspoken journalists, and ordinary protesting citizens alike. “Despite
attempts to use the sector for political gain,” Banegas concluded in 2014, “the judiciary remains
to some extent able to resist the excesses of the regime.”90 Just two weeks after their
conviction, Agbo and Cakpossa were pardoned. And the constitution protests succeeded. Both
the National Assembly and Constitutional Court rejected the amendment attempt, the latter
announcing that changing the number of allowed mandates was an “impossibility.”91 Mathurin
Coffi Nago, the president of the National Assembly, even left Boni Yayi’s party over the issue.92
Before the 2015 legislative elections, political scientist Gilles Yabi speculated the FCBE aspired
to a majority in order to allow the president’s planned reforms to go ahead and “without
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doubt” to authorize a third mandate.93 Nor did this attempt succeed; FCBE instead lost voters,
dropping from 41 to 33 seats.94 With a year left in his term, Boni Yayi gave up his reform efforts
and handed off power to Talon in 2016 as scheduled.
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Continental analysis: today’s Benin in recent African history

Benin is located
in West Africa;
also visible,
west to east:
Senegal,
Guinea, Ivory
Coast, Burkina
Faso, Togo,
Niger

Visible clockwise: DR Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, and
Burundi, each an authoritarian cautionary tale.
Meanwhile, Malawi offers encouraging signs
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Unfortunately, Benin’s democratic success before Talon made it something of an
anomaly in Africa. The American nonprofit Freedom House evaluates countries according to the
strength of their democratic and civil rights, and classifies them as “Free,” “Partly Free,” and
“Not Free.” In its 2021 rankings, just nine African states out of fifty-six qualified as “Free.”96
Benin was not one of them, having fallen to “Partly Free” in the 2020 report. 97 To reclaim its
status, Benin will need to stick to the trail blazed by the “Free” states, and avoid the pitfalls of
the others.
Historical context for the highs and lows is key to understanding democracy in Africa,
just as it was for Benin. Though most African states gained independence from European
powers in the 1960s, representative governments did not necessarily follow. In fact, democratic
institutions have taken a few decades to arrive throughout most of the continent, as Leonardo
Villalon and Peter VonDoepp summarize: “The character of African politics changed
substantially in the early 1990s… Whereas “democracy” was largely a token phenomenon
during the 70s and 80s, by the 1990s, a large number of African states were undertaking
experiments in democratic rule.”98 The early 90s thus marked a wave of democracy, or at least
democracy’s trappings: Benin was just one of numerous states in the continent, eventually a
majority, to adopt multiparty elections. Many of these, though, demonstrate that the mere
holding of elections does not guarantee democratic hallmarks like freedom of speech and
peaceful transfers of power. Indeed, elections can be used to mask authoritarianism. This is a
component of “electoral authoritarianism,” defined by Yonatan Morse as the character of
regimes holding regular but obviously unfair elections.99 A good example is Benin’s next-door
neighbor to the west, Togo, which has held multiparty elections for president every five years
since 1993 – and yet in that time only elected two presidents, the second the son of the first.100
But as the stark differences between Benin and Togo would suggest, the African political
landscape is fairly heterogeneous overall, despite the shared democratization wave. Naturally,
no state is identical to Benin, but many offer illustrative contrasts.
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Partly free: walking the constitutional tightrope of term limits
Senegal, Guinea-Conakry, and Ivory Coast are all Francophone states located on the
West African coast, like Benin and Togo. Turbulent transfers of power have kept the three away
from Freedom House’s “Free” classification, but they are not mired in electoral
authoritarianism, either. They instead occupy the hazy “Partly Free” middle ground which Talon
has been sinking Benin into. That country’s constitutional two-term limit for presidents has so
far been respected; Kérékou and Boni Yayi both served two terms and did not run for a third,
resulting in peaceful transitions of power and boosts to Benin’s democratic credentials. As
Beninese presidential terms are set at five years, in 2026 Talon will find himself at a crossroads:
follow in the footsteps of his predecessors and retire, or diverge from them and make history?
Interestingly, Senegalese, Guinean, and Ivoirian presidents all faced similar choices in the last
decade.101 These states had followed similar post-independence trajectories, too. Each soon
found itself under the decades-long rule of a strongman, but as in Benin, eventually left fullyfledged dictatorship behind and political pluralism settled in.
Senegal would be the first to experience the third term test. In 2000, Abdou Diouf
concluded decades of electoral authoritarianism under the Socialist Party and longtime
opposition figure Abdoulaye Wade became the new president.102 A year later, Wade heavily
promoted a new constitution for the country; Senegalese voters gave it a green light in a
referendum. The 2001 constitution set a limit of two presidential terms, but when Wade’s
second term was nearing its end, he decided to stand for a third in the 2012 election. Wade
argued that because his first term had begun before the 2001 constitution’s adoption, only his
second term counted towards the limit. Though it certainly violated the spirit of the law,
Senegal’s Constitutional Council accepted this argument. Mass protests ensued, claiming the
Arab Spring as a model, and the election’s vote count gave a different candidate, Macky Sall, a
clear 66% majority. Ironically, though, after reelection to a second term, Sall himself has not
ruled out seeking a third term at the next election, due for 2024.103 Senegal’s political prospects
do not look any better for the fact that Ousmane Sonko, considered Sall’s primary opponent,
was arrested in March 2021.
Still, a quick glance suggests Senegal’s democracy remains healthier than Ivory
Coast’s.104 Like Kérékou, Houphouet-Boigny was pushed by economic crisis and political
pressure to permit multiparty elections in the early 1990s. These would lead to the 2010
election of Alassane Ouattara, who after two five-year terms would in 2020 become the first
president since Houphouet-Boigny to seek a third. Like in Senegal, this contradicted the terms
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of constitution designed as a departure from dictatorship. Adopted in 2001, this set a term limit
of two after Houphouet-Boigny had served seven. But like Wade, Ouattara ensured the
adoption of a new constitution after his assumption of the presidency, arguing that this reset
his term count to zero. Both the constitutional referendum and the 2020 election were
boycotted by the divided Ivorian opposition, allowing Ouattara to accomplish what Wade could
not: unconstitutional election to a third term. The 2016 constitution does retain the limit of two
terms, and so the precedent Ouattara set for himself gives him until 2030.
Guinea’s most recent president, Alpha Condé, tried a near-identical strategy to
Ouattara, seeking election to a third term in the same month – October 2020.105 Though he also
won reelection, the effort would end in disaster. Before his presidency, Condé had gained
prominence in Guinea for his four decades of political activism against single-party illiberalism.
This illiberalism ended in 2010 after a military-managed transition to multiparty democracy,
involving the installation of a constitution which, once again, limited presidents to two terms. In
2020, during his second term, Condé engineered the adoption of a new constitution which kept
this limit but explicitly reset the term count. Less than a year after the election, however,
Condé’s hold on power came to an abrupt end when he was overthrown by a military junta in
September 2021. As of this writing, the junta has not committed to a date for the restoration of
civilian government.106 They claim legitimacy by alleging mismanagement and abuse of power
by the Condé regime, and have suspended the 2020 constitution.
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Third term models for Patrice Talon: varying election outcomes
Country
Senegal
Ivory Coast
Guinea
Benin

Leader
Abdoulaye Wade
Alassane Ouattara
Alpha Condé
Patrice Talon

Abdoulaye Wade107

1st, 2nd, 3rd term elections

2000, 2007, 2012
2010, 2015, 2020
2010, 2015, 2020
2016, 2021, 2026?
Alassane Ouattara108

Election outcome
Loses 3rd term bid
Wins 3rd term bid
Wins 3rd term bid, deposed
N/A; no 3rd term bid announced
Alpha Condé109

Boni Yayi’s 2013 campaign for amendments thus took place in a broader context of
third-term interest taking place earlier and later in several surrounding states. As Filip Reyntjens
outlines, machinations to avoid presidential term limits are far from limited to just West Africa;
his article on the subject also cites the examples of Burundi (in eastern Africa) and Cameroon
(in central Africa).110 Yet Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Guinea are notable in particular for their
proximity to Benin. If Talon desires a longer than scheduled stay in power, he would likely look
to the experiences of his West African counterparts, subject to the same regional currents.
Wade, Ouattara, and Condé represent three different outcomes for African presidents who
somehow make it to a third election: failure in the election, success in the election, and success
in the election but subsequent overthrow by coup. Clearly, no president would desire the first
nor last possibility. Should he seek a third term in 2026, Talon will aim for the Ouattara
outcome, electoral victory and full support (so far) from security forces.
Would Talon actually seek a third term? Beyond the simple hunger for power, Reyntjens
suggests a couple potential motivations for African presidents. First, such attempts usually
work.111 Boniface Dulani found that between 2000 and 2017, most examples of African
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presidents pushing for the removal of term limits, 16 out of 22 total, resulted in some change
allowing the incumbent to stay longer.112 Of those 16, Wade is the only one to lose his election
to a third term.113 Reyntjens also cites an interest in securing wealth accumulated during office,
but decades in cotton have already made Talon rich. Other presidents might overstay to avoid
prosecution, but Talon already evaded multiple attempts to hold him accountable when he was
a private citizen and Boni Yayi was in office; his odds would seem even better now that the
judiciary has been filled with Talon-appointed judges.
There is another reason Talon might stay, though, one more particular to him: a prior
interest in emulating Boni Yayi and attempting to alter Benin’s constitution. In 2017, shortly
after he was elected, Talon began campaigning for changes that included Boni Yayi’s suggested
Court of Auditors and a quota for women in the National Assembly, an original idea. After the
April 2019 legislative elections strengthened Talon’s grip on the Assembly, his proposed
amendments were adopted in November 2019. They represent the first changes to Benin’s
constitution since its 1990 adoption. Crucially, though, the amendments themselves do not
betray third term intentions. Article 42, which establishes that “in any case, no one shall be able
to exercise more than two presidential mandates,” is intact except for the addition of “in
his/her life.”114 115 Opposition figures had interpreted the phrase as a means of definitively
establishing Boni Yayi’s ineligibility, speculating that the previous constitution may have
allowed for three non-consecutive mandates.116 Talon partisans, meanwhile, said that it
demonstrated Talon’s good faith in the amendment negotiations. They also pointed to Article
44, which describes qualifications for potential presidents; Talon’s edits added a clause barring
any individual who had been “elected two times President of the Republic and exercised two
mandates as such.” Both before and after the revisions, Article 44 also included a term limit
forbidding any presidential candidate who would be over 70 years old at his inauguration. Born
on May 1st, 1958, Talon was 63 when inaugurated for his second term in 2021.117 If sworn in a
third time in 2026, he would be 68, making him too old for a fourth run. Of course, the retained
term limit would preclude a third. But Talon has deviated from constitutional norms numerous
times before, or at the very least allowed government branches he oversees to do so.
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Over four full years remain in Talon’s second term, opening up a range of possibilities.
Maybe the 2019 amendment bill was meant to test the waters, and Talon will soon try again,
now confident in his movement’s ability to alter Benin’s founding document. Following this line
of thought, leaving term limits untouched for now was only a ruse to dispel concerns among
voters and international observers. A new amendment attempt will benefit from any goodwill
among voters and influence among other government branches Talon has built up in the years
since 2019. But the possibility remains that his allies are correct, and the two-term limit did not
change because Talon does not want it to change.
In addition to the constitutional provisions, a few more factors unique to Benin argue
against Talon standing a third time. After all, Boni Yayi abandoned the idea after pushback from
other branches of government and the larger public. The former factor represents the political
science concept of horizontal accountability, evident when different sectors of government
hold each other answerable to the law and to public interest. Strengthening mechanisms of
horizontal accountability, explains Landry Signé, has aided democratic consolidation in many
African states.118 Because the concentration of power in the executive has been historically
problematic, “one of the most critical obstacles facing Africa’s emerging democracies,” even,
the degree of authority of other branches is crucial.119 Concurring with Andenga’s and
Bierschenk’s criticisms, Signé considers Benin’s legislature a weak agent of horizontal
accountability, as it often cedes responsibilities to the executive or judiciary out of
convenience.120 However, Signé assessed Benin’s judicial branch as “far stronger” than the
National Assembly, both more assertive and independent in the exercise of its powers. Yet
today, Talon’s ability to reproach critics of his government with exile, imprisonment, or closure
suggests that the judiciary is unable or unwilling to seriously challenge him – though the
Nouvelle Tribune decision proves it retains at least some independence, somewhere. All in all,
Benin’s horizontal accountability is significantly weaker under Talon’s rule, and so a serious
attempt from him to run a third time would face less political opposition than Boni Yayi’s effort
ever could have.
But vertical accountability, which describes checks on government from voters, the
foundation of a strong democracy, appears intact. Just as Boni Yayi’s third term interest was
met with spirited protests, so too did citizens resist what has probably been the clearest hint of
Talon’s authoritarianism, the exclusion of the opposition from the 2019 legislative elections. In
addition to the violent protests, the basic fact that turnout was reduced by half compared to
the previous election indicates deep dissatisfaction among the public with the electoral
process. Turnout was stronger in the 2021 presidential election, increasing to 51% from the
legislatives’ 27%. But this only gave Talon votes from 41% of the total electorate, essentially an
official admission that two years later, and with a full term complete, Talon still struggles to win
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over Benin’s population.121 As will be discussed later, using Malawi and Burkina Faso as case
studies, strong vertical accountability presents a credible threat to regime survival.
Speaking generally, term limits have a relatively positive track record for states like
Benin with a history of term limit adherence. Posner and Young, writing for a collection
published in 2018, count 36 instances of sub-Saharan African presidents facing constitutional
term limits, 10 of which arrived after a previous president in that country had already respected
a term limit.122 In each of those 10 cases where a precedent of respect existed, they find, “not a
single president tried to alter or abrogate the constitution to extend his tenure.”123 (Boni Yayi is
not counted among the 10, having only “flirted” with the idea.) Meanwhile, in the 26 cases
where precedents of respect did not exist, most presidents, 16, tried to secure a third term.
Posner and Young admit that these mere glances at the numbers do not conclusively
demonstrate much, but the sharp divide in the data that precedents reveal does at least
suggest that “term limits, once adhered to, are hard to break.”
Conclusive determinations are also difficult because of the small sample sizes involved;
one might expect more case studies given the dozens of states in Africa. Like multiparty
elections, though, term limits are a regrettably new innovation. Before 1990, only a “handful”
of African states with presidential or semi-presidential governments had constitutional term
limits; in 2017, Dulani put the total at 33 out of 43.124 Leaders in the early decades of African
independence tended to enter and exit office “primarily through the barrel of a gun,” Posner
and Young write, with nearly 75% of leaders in the 1960s and 1970s leaving by coups,
overthrows, or assassinations.125 Since the early 1990s, though, voluntary resignations have
become more and more common. Only 20% of leaders who departed office between 2010 and
2015 did so through “irregular means.” As recent history in Guinea and Ivory Coast
demonstrates, the mere existence of term limits does not guarantee their efficacy, but they
nonetheless represent for Dulani a “new era” of African politics.126 The trend extends beyond
Conde and Ouattara to even dictators with decades in office like Cameroon’s Paul Biya and
Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni. The fact that each of these figures went to the trouble of extending
their rule by formal means such as referenda or legislative approval instead of just
strongarming their way to a third term is evidence of political institutions growing in influence,
though from very weak starting points.127
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Perhaps this growth is because term limits are easy targets for agents of vertical
accountability. In contrast to election shenanigans (vote buying, vote tampering, candidacy
restrictions, etc.), they are simple for international observers and ordinary citizens alike to
track. It is for this reason that a Talon third term bid might meet much more widespread
resistance than anything he has done thus far. Polling in Benin by the nonpartisan Africa-wide
project Afrobarometer suggests that even Talon supporters are on board with a constitutional
limit of two presidential terms: in 2020, 88% of polled Beninois adults “agreed” or “totally
agreed” with the rule.128 This is a higher total than the Afrobarometer average over 34 African
countries in 2019-2021, 76%.129 Moreover, Posner and Young propose, since they represent
clear opportunities to gain power, term limits can reinvigorate opposition parties and activists,
spurring collaboration towards a common goal. Ajavon, Aivo, and Madougou are were all
distanced from politics, prevented from challenging Talon in his election to a second term, but
the next four years will give the opposition more time to strategize, learn from their mistakes,
and rally around a new candidate.
Talon himself will probably also take the years leading up to 2026 to decide whether or
not to run for the presidency. This thesis’ focus on the context of this choice has been extensive
because his decision will have massive implications for democracy in Benin. A third Talon run
would signal a willingness to not only use the powers of the presidency as he pleases, but for as
long as he pleases, elevating him above the law in a novel way. A guess made years in advance,
without knowledge of the course of Talon’s second term, may be naïve, but the evidence
suggests that Talon will not run again. He has left untouched constitutional provisions guarding
against third terms, and historical precedent endows these provisions with some strength.
Running again would present new risks, and Talon does not seem to have an obvious personal
motivation beyond enjoyment of his position.
This does not mean, though, that third term scenarios should not be explored. If he does
decide to break precedent, Talon has a range of models to take inspiration from. Recent events
from Africa’s examples of electoral authoritarianism likely diffuse across the continent and offer
lessons to aspiring autocrats.

128

“Résumé des résultats: Enquête Afrobarometer Round 8 au Bénin, 2020.” Afrobarometer.
Dulani, Boniface. “Long-serving African presidents say the people want them to stay on. Is that true?”
Afrobarometer, November 10 2021.
129

30

Not free: the convenience of aid and the awkwardness of leaving office
Though located far to the southeast, in an entirely different region of Africa, Rwanda
and its president, Paul Kagame, might present a worthwhile comparison to Benin – particularly
since it is a comparison Talon himself seems to welcome. In an interview with RFI, Talon was
asked if he took Kagame as a model.130 “No,” he responded, before adding, “He does admirable
things, certainly.” He then highlighted “my neighbor from Togo, my neighbor from Nigeria,”
diplomatically affirming that “each one does things which are admirable, and each also does
things which can be criticized.” Talon is not the only one with praise for the East African
president. According to Tony Blair, Kagame is a “visionary leader,” while to Bill Clinton he is
“one of the greatest leaders of our time.”131 To get to this point, Rwanda traversed a familiar
path for African states, a one-party dictatorship until the 1990s, but then encountered a novel
and tragic obstacle: the 1994 Rwandan genocide, when hundreds of thousands lost their lives
to inter-ethnic violence. Kagame, a former army officer, quickly became the traumatized
nation’s de facto and then de jure leader. Per Foreign Affairs’ Jonathan Tepperman, while
Kagame has led Rwanda to make “spectacular progress” powered by a “booming economy”
over the past two decades, he has also overseen persecution of Rwandan political opposition
and journalists.132 Andenga guesses that Talon takes Kagame as inspiration, and beyond the
historical details, the analogy works.133 Both leaders happily give interviews to Western media,
and take the opportunity to brush aside their authoritarian excesses and claim legitimacy
through economic growth. When Foreign Affairs asked about his abuse of power, Kagame
responded curtly: “A big percentage of [experts] have never even visited the place they are
talking about…Experts want to see Rwanda in their own image.”134 Talon was more direct when
Jeune Afrique asked about the “monochrome” National Assembly.135 “Benin was certainly
celebrated as one of the champions of democracy in Africa, but at what cost?” he rhetorically
wondered. For Talon, the “constraining conditions” his government imposed on candidacies
were somehow necessary “so that our democracy generates development.” Sitting down with
Le Monde, Kagame was asked whether Rwanda’s model of development “must necessarily be
authoritarian.” “You can’t transpose the Rwandan model… The word ‘authoritarian’ is yours,”
Kagame responded, arguing that his country’s circumstances make it a unique case the West
doesn’t understand.136
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If there is a Rwandan model of development, Talon may nonetheless try to transpose
both its economic and political character. He may try to emulate the dynamism of Kagame,
Talon’s elder by one year, whom supporters and detractors alike describe as “visionary and
determined to the point of ruthlessness.”137 Kagame’s charisma has helped win not just plaudits
from foreign dignitaries, but large sums of development aid, and this aid has served to further
reinforce his strong position on the international stage. The UK government has written that
Kagame “uses aid very well, both in terms of the results it achieves and accounting for its
use,”138 and Zoe Marriage estimates that Kagame’s leadership is a helpful riposte to 1990s
critiques of African aid’s efficacy.139 Western funds in Rwanda are used transparently and
practically, with Kagame deriving little personal material gain from his position, and any
strategic returns to the donors are negligible. Rwanda is still one of the world’s most aiddependent nations, but aid has helped fuel progress towards reducing aid’s share of the state
budget from 86% in 2000 to 59% in 2021, even while overall amounts of aid increase.140
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American foreign aid to Rwanda spiked after the 1994 genocide, and has remained at
similiar levels in recent years141
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World Bank data indicates that Rwandan aid from all sources has now increased to well
beyond amounts provided immediately after the genocide 142
However, Marriage asserts, the status quo of continuing Western rhetorical and
financial support for Kagame “implicates the providers of budget support in the domestic and
regional violence committed by the Rwandan leadership.”143 She estimates that not only are
donors complicit in Kagame’s authoritarianism, but they view it as necessary to their
development vision for Rwanda. Her conclusion is striking, and might intrigue Talon: “Budget
support is provided to stop Kagame losing his grip.”144 Rwanda’s story suggests that if an
African leader uses his resources and image effectively enough, he can rule indefinitely as a
strongman and receive international help for it. Of course, the uniqueness of the Rwandan
genocide is a key caveat Kagame can perversely exploit; he often points out that, having
neglected Rwanda during the tragedy, donors have money but lack moral high ground.145 But
Rwanda is only one particularly interesting example of Western disinterest in democracy.
Devereaux Evans and van de Walle explain that democracy in African states “is often presented
as a long-term goal rather than an immediate priority, best supported today by trade and
economic development.”146 Worryingly, praise for “the economic virtues” of authoritarianism in
Africa has become increasingly common.147 A comforting state of affairs, naturally, for current
and prospective autocrats.
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Kagame’s position is even stronger given that he faces an “extremely low level” of
resistance from citizens,148 but a different story recently unfolded in Rwanda’s neighbor to the
south. Like the West Africans described above, in 2015 President Pierre Nkurunziza of Burundi
tried to seek a third term forbidden by the constitution.149 First he tried having an amendment
passed through parliament, but could not gain a large enough majority. Next Nkurunziza tried
to coerce Burundi’s Constitutional Court; their decision in his favor triggered a crisis so
profound that around 1,200 Burundians were killed and over 300,000 left the country over its
course.150 At the unrest’s conclusion, much of civil society and the political opposition was in
exile, and the independent press had “all but disappeared.” The repression heavily damaged
Burundi’s economy, and a coup attempt meant that it threatened Nkurunziza’s life, too.
Ironically, he would not even survive the term which had cost him so much. In June 2020, with
two months to go, Nkurunziza died of a heart attack. 151 On the one hand, this is a cautionary
tale for Talon, the story of a politician who took dangerous risks for little gain. But more
extensive study of Nkurunziza would also offer lessons in extending power, lessons the more
secure Kagame could not offer: how to suppress enormous protests, how to halt an in-progress
coup, how to keep one’s head above water while a storm rages all around.
Stability in Rwanda and chaos in Burundi has taken place in the shadow of a much larger
common neighbor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Once again, term limits provoked a
national crisis in the 2010s, but President Joseph Kabila took a more encouraging tactic than
Nkurunziza: actually stepping down.152 This still only occurred after various attempts at
constitutional amendments, dozens killed protesting, and a two-year delay in organizing the
2018 election of his successor, Felix Tshisekedi. Over its history, the DRC has become almost a
stereotype for the failures of democracy in Africa, marred since independence by dictatorship
and warfare, so the transition to Tshisekedi was praised as a historic first peaceful transition of
power. Except for one small problem: Tshisekedi probably did not win the election. Two
overlapping sets of leaked vote data are said to contradict the official vote tally and give Martin
Fayulu, Kabila’s main rival, the right to the presidency instead.153 Foreign academics and
European governments have found Fayulu’s allegations of fraud credible, particularly since
Kabila’s party gained an overwhelming majority of legislature seats in the same vote despite its
presidential candidate coming in a distant third. Berwouts and Reyntjens speculate that this
“electoral coup d’état” was arranged in order to reduce pressure on Kabila, keep Fayulu away
from power, and keep Kabila and his party in power, all at the same time.154 Perhaps Talon will
pull off a similar trick with similar electoral fraud or simply continued constraints on
148
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candidacies. He could respect democratic norms by leaving at the end of his current term, but
cede the position to a handpicked successor so as to keep his own access to power just a little
longer and maintain leverage on his replacement.
Recent lessons for the aspiring autocrat in Central and East Africa
Country
Rwanda
Burundi
DR Congo

Leader
Paul Kagame
Pierre Nkurunziza
Joseph Kabila

Paul Kagame155

Autocratic option
Successful combination of aid and authoritarianism
Successful suppression of opposition
Successful transition to a preferred successor
Pierre Nkurunziza156

Joseph Kabila157
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Free: or at least on the way there
Finally, two more states are bright causes for optimism amid the many failures of
African democracy. Malawi in particular is an especially worthy subject of future study, possibly
presenting a roadmap in resisting democratic backsliding: the southeastern African state has
weathered no fewer than three political crises over the past decade. Most recently, the 2019
Malawian presidential election was successfully invalidated and re-ran in 2020 after judges
found evidence of vote tampering in the first poll.158 The reverse scenario had played out in
2014, when incumbent president Joyce Banda ordered a rerun after losing that year’s election.
This time, too, horizontal accountability held firm; Malawi’s High Court declared the order
unconstitutional and Banda stepped down, congratulating her successor.159 160 However, the
worst challenge was not an isolated event, but a multiyear period of democratic backsliding
from 2009 to 2012 that resembles recent years in Benin. After his second term began, President
Bingu wa Mutharika repeatedly attacked civil liberties, calling on supporters to harass critical
civil society organizations and requiring that those planning demonstrations pay for
permission.161 162 A new law was passed allowing Mutharika’s government to ban publications
considered “threatening to the public interest.” Mutharika also tried to prevent Banda from
registering a new political party, and jailed another opposition leader, the previous president’s
son.
Mass protests against Mutharika’s regime began in mid-2011 and found significant
success. Considered “unprecedented in Malawi’s democratic era,” they were the result of a
broad coalition of civil society groups spanning business, journalism, and the church and
surprised even their organizers in how quickly they spread across the country.163 Mutharika’s
government first permitted lethal police brutality and threatened the organizers with arrest,
but by March 2012 were “running scared”164 and had scheduled a meeting with the opposition
to discuss the president’s resignation.165 Although Mutharika’s death just before the meeting
complicates the question, VonDoepp concludes that the organized resistance was responsible
and successful in halting democratic backsliding and fortifying the rule of law in Malawi. He
identifies four facilitating factors: the economic context, low levels of polarization, a credible
civil society, and useful allies.166
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Malawi’s backsliding and protests took place in the midst of a serious economic
downturn, with growth rates declining to negative levels during Mutharika’s term.167 Although
protest leaders kept the rule of law at the center of their demands, financial worries attracted
influential trade unions and business elites to the movement, and brought further attention to
the government’s missteps. Hence, Mutharika’s downfall stands in contrast to Rwanda’s
continuous growth under Kagame, but actually parallels Benin twenty years earlier under
Kérékou. His nationalization policies resulted in a bloated and inefficient public sector that in
the late 1980s could not even pay its civil servants’ salaries, removing a key base of government
support. As economic decline came to harm the entire country, what were initially “a series of
isolated demands for better pay or working conditions” evolved into a unified politics-focused
campaign.168
“Development, that’s it!” was Talon’s 2021 campaign slogan; he well understands the
importance of economic growth to his continued popularity. Malawi under Bingu wa Mutharika
proves that a government need not be avowedly socialist like late-1980s Benin to fall victim to
depression-driven resistance. In fact, opposition to backsliding might even be more likely under
liberal economic management. Cheeseman writes that under Kérékou, socialism was retained
in part because public ownership prevented wealthy entrepreneurs from emerging and funding
opposition to Kérékou.169 This fear was credible, according to Arriola; he asserts that
liberalization around Africa has historically allowed entrepreneurs to become “pivotal political
actors.”170 Again, Talon knows this well, having himself grown rich, along with Ajavon, from the
economic liberalization carried out during the same years Benin opened up politically.171 He will
not only want to maintain his image as an effective manager of the economy, but complement
his exiling of political opponents by devising ways to push out or ally with other politically active
businessmen.
In VonDoepp’s second listed factor, Benin scores poorly: its long history of regionalist
politics indicates a high level of geography-based polarization. Talon overcame this polarization
by campaigning as an unaffiliated outsider and assembling a broadly national coalition once in
power. But regionalist squabbles persist; one anonymous BR legislator complained to Jeune
Afrique that “the UP, these are essentially people from the UN [a former Amoussou-led party],
a party whose principle was simple: power should go to people from the south… they are
dinosaurs, people of the old school.”172 This infighting could frustrate efforts at unity from
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Talon, a southerner; they could also destabilize Benin’s political opposition if it is not
sufficiently focused.
VonDoepp also considers Malawi to have benefitted from a “credible” civil society.173
This thesis has not thoroughly examined that subject and diagnosed the strength of civil society
in Benin, but recent history is encouraging. There is academia, for instance, from which Aivo
risked and lost a comfortable position as a law school dean to rally against Talon. The students
who protested against Kérékou in 1989 will have become richer and more influential in the
intervening decades; further research should investigate their thoughts on Talon. Even before
democratization, though, students in Benin had already been a “center of political mobilization”
against different governments since independence.174 Amnesty International is the most cited
NGO by Western media reporting on anti-democratic news in Benin. The organization has a
Cotonou office (but none in Rwanda, Burundi, or the DRC), and regular social media activity
indicates that the office holds seminars and community education campaigns.175 A key player in
the Malawi organizing was the PAC, a network of smaller faith-based organizations which,
unlike most civil society organizations, can claim some sort of connection to most Malawian
citizens.176 Further research might investigate the role of religious groups in Benin, determining
whether their authority figures have any interest or influence in politics.
Finally, VonDoepp also underlines the importance of useful allies in the antiauthoritarianism fight. For Malawi, this included an independent media which provided regular
coverage of the protests, helping to spread word of them. Benin’s record is mixed on this front.
La Nouvelle Tribune and Benin Web TV have been independent enough to find themselves
pursued by the government. Meanwhile, every single L’Evénement Précis editorial is written by
Olivier Allocheme, who gives that paper a pro-Talon slant. His take on the Madougou and Aivo
arrests was to advise moderation to Talon: “It is necessary to punish to give the example, but it
is also especially necessary to work to ease political tensions.”177 Benin Espoir concluded a
recent article on Aivo by wishing good judgement to Talon, “the Father of the Nation, he who
works constantly to rally the Beninois around the construction of our common nation.”178 And
Actu Benin appears to have been the only of these newspapers to neither publish nor ignore
Amnesty International’s report on the 2019 elections, instead criticizing it as “against all logic”
and full of “counter-truths.”179 VonDoepp also cites as allies foreign donors, who reduced their
aid allocations to Malawi in 2011 to signal displeasure with Mutharika.180 However, foreign aid
comprised around 20% of Benin’s 2019 government expenses, which, while significant, is
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nowhere near the 80% of expenses provided to Malawi in 2011.181 Foreign aid would therefore
not be leverage as heavy in Benin as it was in Malawi. Like Malawians, Benin’s citizens enjoy an
independent press, but more analytical research should be conducted to better assess the
overall degree of independence.
Lastly, recent history in one of Benin’s neighbors also warns against anti-democratic
behavior. In 2014, when President Blaise Compaoré asked the parliament of Burkina Faso to
consider an amendment allowing him to run for a third term, student-led protests broke out
that became so violent, thousands of citizens would storm the National Assembly building.182
“In order to preserve the democratic gains, as well as social peace,” announced Compaoré, he
resigned and fled to Ivory Coast.183 Fearful for his life, he had lost the support of Burkina Faso’s
military. Freedom House’s latest report explains that though the country’s democratic
institutions are still under construction, the presidential and legislative elections that followed
Compaoré’s ouster “have laid a foundation for [their] continued development.”184

Third term models for Patrice Talon: the worst-case scenario
Country
Burkina Faso
Benin

Leader
Blaise Compaoré
Patrice Talon

Bingu wa Mutharika185

1st, 2nd, 3rd term elections

2005, 2010, 2015
2016, 2021, 2026?

Election outcome
N/A; deposed before election
N/A; no 3rd term bid announced

Blaise Compaoré186
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The case studies presented in this section are an attempt to offset the uncertainty
surrounding Benin’s democratic trajectory. Taken together, they represent essentially every
possible direction the country could take. Benin’s contemporary democratic backsliding actually
gives it more resemblance to its counterparts, although the leaders behind the backsliding have
encountered a variety of fates.
Potential near futures for democracy in Benin
Talon doesn’t run for a 3rd term
No run prepared; anti-Talon candidate wins (past Benin)
No run prepared; pro-Talon candidate wins (DR Congo)
Talon tries to prepare a run, but is thwarted (Burkina Faso)
rd
Talon runs for a 3 term
Talon loses the election (Senegal)
Talon wins the election, but is deposed (Guinea)
Talon wins the election, continues in office ->
-> Talon continues in office
Little resistance to continued tenure (Rwanda)
Great resistance to continued tenure ->
-> Great popular resistance to
Resistance works, relatively little harm (Malawi)
continued tenure
Resistance fails, relatively great harm (Burundi)
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Conclusion
On September 22nd, 2021, an unexpected meeting took place in Cotonou. For the first
time since 2016, Boni Yayi publicly met with Talon.187 “This is an honor for me,” gushed Talon at
the presidential palace, “a great pleasure to see you again. I am quite moved.” Boni Yayi made
no statement so enthusiastic, preferring to emphasize that “this isn’t a Talon-Yayi affair.” Even
in retirement, he took the opportunity to adopt a position of leadership: “The question is rather
to know what to do so that our fellow citizens… meet the challenges and interior and exterior
shocks our country still confronts, in particular during electoral decisions these last three
years.” News outlets and Boni Yayi’s social media published a list of eight of what Boni Yayi
called “measures of national salvation” he recommended that Talon take. They began with “A –
End all the political arrests to permit all our compatriots abroad to come back home,” and
ended with “H – Finally, a dialogue to prevent deaths is preferable to waiting for deaths before
a dialogue.” The official press release from the presidential office did not quote these
recommendations.188 It only referenced “strong measures” the former president had asked the
current one to take, “in order that certain Beninois citizens in the care of law enforcement
following political crises recover liberty and that those of our compatriots who went into exile
can come back to the fold.” The wording is significant – Benin’s political prisoners are described
not as criminals or terrorists, but as citizens deprived of their liberty. Add on to the rhetoric the
fact that the meeting took place at all, giving a Talon critic an elevated platform, and the press
release’s final sentence gains some credibility: “This long-awaited meeting is the proof that
President Talon, concerned about a calm political climate in the country, remains open to
dialogue.”
Overall, the meeting is one of several indications that Benin’s democratic trajectory has
received heavy damage in the short term but will probably remain positive in the long term.
Patrice Talon does not fit the profile of a president who plans to prolong his time in office
unconstitutionally by running for a third time. He has so far left in place constitutional
provisions against such an attempt, provisions which already have a uniquely effective track
record, have received legal support in the past, and enjoy popular support today. Benin’s
neighbors happen to be case studies in third term bids; in some the bid succeeded, in others
the bid failed, and in none were democratic institutions as entrenched as they were in preTalon Benin. Collectively, they prove a term limit violation would be a great risk in Benin.
Still, Talon’s second term has only just started; if he were to mount a serious push for a
third term, it would come later. His first term was discouragingly illiberal in enough regards that
scholars can confidently consider Benin under Talon a democracy in decline, though the record
has some nuance. Political opposition has been decimated, but independent journalism within
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Benin continues, and has received support from the judicial branch. Talon understands that his
image depends on more than just economic prosperity and so has taken small measures to
backtrack on the backsliding, such as removing the social media tax and making the electoral
code slightly less stringent.
A narrative of the past is informative, but history will not determine the future – the
people of the present will. In November 2021, Benin’s national soccer team received a
devastating blow, losing a match to DR Congo that ended their 2022 World Cup qualification
hopes. An editorial in L’Evénement Précis the next day recounted the online complaints of
numerous Beninois fans, including even a sports journalist and minor politician, that the
national soccer federation had not done “what was necessary” – buying off the referee.189 “This
reaction,” concluded the editorial, “is the true conception of the Beninois towards corruption.
As long as it helps us, corruption is a good deal. A corruption which doesn’t help us, is to be
fought. Understand, whoever is able to.”
That the editorial was written by Olivier Allocheme, a journalist who himself takes at
face value the Talon government’s claim that practically every major opposition figure is
corrupt, is an ironic subtext that does not detract from the larger message. The position taken
by Benin’s citizens matters. The direction of the democratic backsliding is not solely one
determined by Talon, and one only need look a few years back, at a few other states in Africa,
for proof. Popular mobilization inspired meaningful change in both Malawi and Burkina Faso,
and even in Senegal, where Abdoulaye Wade secured third term approval, opposition was
meaningful enough that voters successfully united to elect a replacement. If Talon chooses to
risk unprecedented levels of protest, and accompanying strikes and lower productivity, he can
look to Burundi, Rwanda, and Togo for tips on navigating a transition to a third term and then
electoral authoritarianism. However, it is more likely that at the end of his second term,
satisfied with having smoothly implemented his vision for Benin, Talon takes the DR Congo
option – arranging for a friendly, perhaps indebted, figure to take over, and finally resting on his
laurels.
After that, who knows? An understanding of democracy and its survival should be
“dynamic,” Villalon and VonDoepp argue.190 The African democratic experience is
heterogeneous, and Benin is now “Partly Free,” somewhere between the rule of law and the
rule of a strongman. More research should be conducted to better locate Benin’s position,
focusing particularly on the strengths and weaknesses of civil society. But speculation will
always just be speculation, and must therefore be accompanied with an acknowledgement of
its limits and a hope that Benin’s battered democracy will soon recover.
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